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Introduction
IPsec is the current security standard for the Internet Protocol IP [5, 6, 7, 9, 10] . According to this standard, a selected computer pair (p, q) in the Internet has to establish a unidirectional "security association", or SA for short, before computer p can start sending messages to computer q. The components of the SA from computer p to computer q include authentication and encryption keys and shared secrets, algorithms used for authentication and encryption, lifetimes of the keys, a sequence number at computer p used for sending messages to q, an anti-replay window at computer q, and some other parameters. The keys and algorithms specified in the SA from p to q will be used to authenticate or encrypt the messages whose original source is p and whose ultimate destination is q in order to provide integrity or confidentiality services to these messages. The sequence number at p and the antireplay window at q, on the other hand, are used to check whether the received messages are replayed or not, so as to provide anti-replay service to these messages.
IPsec uses an anti-replay window protocol, which exploits the sequence number at p and the anti-replay window at q, to provide anti-replay service. The antireplay window protocol guarantees that every replayed message inserted by an adversary toward computer q will be detected and discarded by q. This guarantee is provided by adding increasing sequence numbers to all IP messages sent from p to q. Thus, p needs to always remember the sequence number of the last sent message, and q needs to always remember the sequence number of the last received message. However, this guarantee only holds when both computers p and q stay up and no reset occurs to them. If computer p or q is reset during the lifetime of the SA from p to q, these sequence numbers can be forgotten, and this leads to two bad possibilities: unbounded number of fresh messages sent from p to q can be discarded by q, and unbounded number of replayed messages can be accepted by q. In this paper, we propose two operations, "SAVE" and "FETCH", which can be added to the anti-replay window protocol such that these bad possibilities can be prevented.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally specify the anti-replay window protocol. In Section 3, we point out the problems with the anti-replay window protocol in presence of resets. In Section 4, we discuss how the two operations, "SAVE" and "FETCH", can be added to the anti-replay window protocol. We conclude our presentation in Section 5.
The protocols in this paper are specified using a version of the Abstract Protocol (AP) Notation presented in [1] . In this notation, each process in a protocol is defined by a set of constants, a set of variables, and a set of actions. For example, in a protocol consisting of two processes x and y, process x can be defined as follows. The constants of process x have fixed values. The variables of process x can be read and updated by the actions of process x. Comments can be added anywhere in a process definition; each comment is placed between the two brackets { and }.
Each <action> of process x is of the form: <guard> → <statement> The guard of an action of x is either a boolean expression over the constants and variables of x or a receive guard of the form rcv <message> from y.
Executing an action consists of executing the statement of this action. Executing the actions (of different processes) in a protocol proceeds according to the following three rules. First, an action is executed only when its guard is true. Second, the actions in a protocol are executed one at a time. Third, an action whose guard is continuously true is eventually executed.
The <statement> of an action of x is a sequence of one of the following forms: 
Anti-Replay Window Protocol in IPsec
In the anti-replay window protocol, a process p sends a continuous stream of messages to another process q. The sent messages may be lost or reordered before they are received by q. A message m is said to suffer a reorder of degree w iff the w-th message sent (by p) after m is received (by q) before m.
At any instant, an adversary can insert in the message stream from p to q a copy of any message t that was sent earlier by p. Because of the inserted messages, there is a possibility that process q receives and delivers multiple copies of the same message. To prevent this possibility, p and q are designed such that the following two conditions are satisfied for a given value w.
w-Delivery:
Process q delivers at least one copy of every message that is neither lost nor suffered a reorder of degree w or more after it is sent by p.
Discrimination:
Process q delivers at most one copy of every message sent by p.
To satisfy these two conditions, p attaches a unique sequence number to each message before sending the message to q, and q maintains a window of w consecutive sequence numbers. For each sequence number s in the window, q maintains a boolean variable indicating whether or not q has already received the message whose sequence number is s. The right edge of the window stands for the largest sequence number in the window.
There are three cases to consider when process q receives a message whose sequence number is s. First, if s is smaller than all sequence numbers in the window, then q cannot determine whether it has received this message before, and to be on the safe side, q assumes that this message has been received before and discards it. Second, if s is one of the sequence numbers in the window, q can determine whether it has received this message before (and so it discards this message) or it has not received this message before (and so it delivers this message). Third, if s is larger than all sequence numbers in the window, then q determines that it has not received this message before. In this case q delivers the message, and slides the window such that s becomes the new right edge of the window.
Next, we present the anti-replay window protocol using the AP Notation. Process p can be specified as follows. Process q has two variables called wdw and r. Array wdw is the window, and variable r represents the right edge of this window, which carries the largest sequence number in this window. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, wdw[i] is true iff process q has already received msg(x), where x = r-w+i. Process q can be specified as follows.
Process q has one action, in which q receives msg(x) from p, and decides whether to discard or deliver the message according to the value of x and the status of wdw.
Problems with IPsec in Presence of Resets
The anti-replay window protocol presented in Section 2 can be used to detect replayed messages. Although in some cases this protocol may discard a large amount of good messages when severe message reorders occur [2] , it guarantees that each replayed message will be detected and discarded. However, this guarantee will not hold when either process q or process p in the anti-replay window protocol is reset and wakes up later. We discuss what can occur in the following two paragraphs.
First, consider the case where process q is reset and wakes up later. When q wakes up, q has lost all previous information about its anti-replay window, including the right edge of the window, r. Thus q resumes its operation with r set to 0 and each entry of array wdw set to false, and any message received next by q with a sequence number larger than 0 will be accepted by q. Suppose the last fresh sequence number received by q before the reset is x, which is unbounded. In this case, an adversary can replay in order all the messages with sequence numbers within the range from 1 to x, and all these replayed messages will be unsuspectedly accepted by q.
Next, consider the case where process p is reset and wakes up later. When p wakes up, p has forgotten the last sequence number s it used on the last message sent to q. Thus p resumes its operation with s set to 0, and the next fresh message p sends to q will be msg(0), and the next fresh message p sends to q will be msg(1), and so on. Suppose the current right edge of the anti-replay window at q is y, which is unbounded. In this case, all fresh messages sent from p to q with sequence numbers less than y-w+1, which is the left edge of the window, will be regarded as replayed messages and will be discarded by q. (All fresh messages sent from p to q with sequence numbers within the range from y-w+1 to y will be either discarded or accepted according to the status of the antireplay window.)
To block any chance for an adversary to replay messages, the IPsec Working Group at IETF suggests that if either peer of an IPsec SA is reset, then no matter the reset peer wakes up after a while or not, the entire IPsec SA should be deleted and reestablished once the reset is detected [3, 8] . In this way, all old messages cannot pass integrity check under the new SA, and thus cannot be used by an adversary for replaying. However, reestablishing the entire IPsec SA is very expensive. It takes the recomputation of most attributes of this SA, especially the keys and shared secrets, and the renegotiation of all these attributes using a secured connection. Moreover, a host may have multiple SAs existing at the same time, either for the same peer or for different peers. Requiring a host with multiple existing SAs to drop and reestablish all the existing SAs because of a reset stands for a huge amount of overhead for this host. In fact, a closer observation reveals that the deletion and reestablishment of the entire SA is unnecessary. More specifically, the only attributes of an SA that keep changing along with every packet this SA secures are the sequence number and the anti-replay window. The other attributes, like authentication and encryption keys and shared secrets, algorithms, and lifetimes of the keys, remains the same during the lifetime of this SA. Therefore, if the two communicating peers of an SA can keep a state of those unchanging attributes and remember a recent state of their sequence numbers, then the SA should be still usable after a reset by recalling the state of those unchanging attributes and by recalling the last state of the sequence numbers prior to the reset. In the next section, we discuss how two operations, "SAVE" and "FETCH", can be added to the anti-replay window protocol so as to rescue and reuse the whole SA after a reset occurred to one or both of the two communicating peers.
A Protocol with SAVE and FETCH Operations
The functions of SAVE and FETCH are straightforward. When the SAVE operation is executed at a computer, the last sequence number kept in the memory of that computer will be stored in the persistent memory of that computer. We assume that the content of the persistent memory of a computer will not be corrupted or erased by a reset of that computer; an example of persistent memory is a hard disk. When the FETCH operation is executed at a computer, the last stored sequence number will be loaded from the persistent memory into the memory. (SAVE and FETCH can be implemented by write-to-file and read-from-file operations in an operating system.) SAVE and FETCH can be used in designing a new anti-replay window protocol that can avoid the impact of resets. A computer that executes the new anti-replay window protocol can regularly execute SAVE to store a copy of a recent sequence number in its persistent memory. If this computer is reset and wakes up shortly, then although the last sequence number kept in its memory has been forgotten, this computer can execute FETCH to reload the sequence number stored in its persistent memory into its memory.
To make sure the new protocol is correct, however, two considerations need to be addressed before the reloaded sequence number can be used for the next sent (or received) message of the resumed traffic. Firstly, the execution of SAVE takes some time, during which the computer can still send (or receive) messages. Hence there can be a gap between the reloaded sequence number (which is the last stored sequence number) and the sequence number of the last message sent (or received) by this computer before the reset. If a computer that plays the sender uses the reloaded sequence number directly and the size of the gap between the reloaded sequence number and the last sent sequence number before the reset is n, then the first n sent messages will be regarded as replayed messages by the receiver and will be discarded. If a computer that plays the receiver uses the reloaded sequence number directly, then an adversary can replay old messages whose sequence numbers are in the gap between the reloaded sequence number and the last received sequence number. These replayed messages will be accepted by the receiver because their sequence numbers look fresh to the receiver. In order to avoid these bad possibilities, a leap number should be added to the reloaded sequence number to leap over the gap before it can be used. This leap number must be large enough to ensure that after adding it to the reloaded sequence number, the resulting new sequence number is larger than all previously used sequence numbers.
Secondly, another reset can occur to the same computer that just waked up and has not yet executed the first SAVE after the last reset. In this case, those sequence numbers that have been used before the second reset occurs will be reused (or can be replayed) after the machine wakes up again. To avoid this problem, the computer should first execute a SAVE after the leap number is added to the reloaded sequence number. If this computer plays the sender, it will wait for the SAVE to finish before it sends the next message. If this computer plays the receiver, it will temporarily keep the messages that are received before the SAVE finishes in a buffer. After the SAVE completes its execution, messages kept in the buffer will be either delivered or discarded based on their sequence numbers.
Moreover, we have to decide how frequently the SAVE operation should be executed. On one hand, we do not want to execute SAVE too frequently because this can generate too much overhead. On the other hand, we do not want to execute SAVE too infrequently so that the saved sequence number is not recent enough. Our choice of the interval between two SAVEs is the maximum number of messages that can be sent (or received) during the execution time of SAVE. (For example, on a Pentium III 730-MHz machine running Linux 2.4.18, a write-to-file operation takes 100ms and sending a 1000-byte message takes 4ms on average. In this case, we can set the interval between two SAVEs to be at least 25.) Note that we measure the interval between two SAVEs in terms of the number of messages, rather than in terms of time, because the rate of message generation may change over time. Note also that the amount of time taken by every execution of SAVE can be different according to the current load of CPU. Therefore, we pick a reasonable upper bound of the execution time of SAVE, and determine the maximum number of messages that can be sent (or received) during this amount of time.
Next, we present the new anti-replay window protocol augmented with SAVE and FETCH. The new process p has two constants K p and T p , and has two additional variables ls and wait. K p is the interval between the two stored sequence numbers of two consecutive SAVE operations in process p. T p is the execution time of a SAVE operation at p. Variable ls is the last stored sequence number. Variable wait is a boolean that is set to true only when process p wakes up after a reset and is storing the new sequence number resulting from adding the leap number to the reloaded sequence number. The new process p can be specified as follows. In the first action of process p, p increments the sequence number s by 1 and sends the next message msg(s) to process q when p is not waiting for a SAVE that executes after a FETCH to finish. Meanwhile, p also checks whether s has become K p greater than the last stored sequence number, ls. If so, p executes SAVE to store s into persistent memory. (This SAVE should be executed in the background so that it does not block the normal communication between p and q.) In the second action, when p wakes up after a reset, p executes FETCH to reload the last stored sequence number, executes SAVE to store the new sequence number, and sets off a timer waiting for the SAVE to finish. In the third action, the timer expires after T p time units (which means that the SAVE should have finished), so p stops waiting and sets s to its new value. Since variable wait has been set to false, the first action is enabled again and p can send the next message msg(s) to q.
The new process q that supports SAVE and FETCH has two additional constants K q and T q , and three additional variables cnt, wait, and buff. K q is the interval between the two stored sequence numbers of two consecutive SAVE operations in process q. T q is the execution time of a SAVE operation at q. Variable cnt keeps track of the number of good messages received after a regular SAVE was executed last. Variable wait is a boolean that is set to true only when process q wakes up after a reset and is storing the new sequence number resulting from adding the leap number to the reloaded sequence number. Variable buff is an array that buffers the sequence numbers received while a SAVE that executes after a FETCH has not yet finished. The new process q can be specified as follows. 
